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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD LYNN WRIGHT,

:

Petitioner/Appellant, :
v.

:

M. ELDON BARNES, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Respondent/Appellee.

:

Case No. 900186-CA

Category No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a denial of a petition for writ of
habeas corpus.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(g) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the
district court erred in denying the petition for writ of habeas
corpus.

A denial of habeas corpus relief will be reviewed in the

light most favorable to the judgment and will not be reversed
unless there is no reasonable basis to support the denial.

Bundy

v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The applicable constitutional provisions for a
determination of this case are referred to in the body of this
brief

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Richard Lynn Wright, was charged with two
counts of aggravated robbery, first degree felonies, in violation
of Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-302 (1990),1 and two counts of
aggravated kidnapping, first degree felonies, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1990).

Petitioner moved to dismiss

the charges on speedy trial grounds, which motion was denied on
March 22, 1985, by the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge, Second
Judicial District Court, Weber County, State of Utah.

On June

14, 1985, a jury trial commenced before the Honorable David E.
Roth, Judge, Second Judicial District Court.

On June 17, 1985,

the jury returned verdicts of guilty to both counts of aggravated
robbery and not guilty as to aggravated kidnapping.

Petitionee

was sentenced to concurrent statutory indeterminate terms in the
3
Utah State Prison of five years to life.
Petitioner directly appealed his convictions to the
Utah Supreme Court.

On June 9, 1987, the convictions were

affirmed in State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987).

A

petition for rehearing was denied on November 30, 1987.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 was amended in 1989, subsequent to
the trial in this case; but, the amendment is not applicable to
the present facts.
o
The kidnapping statute was also amended to impose minimum
mandatory sentences, however, these provisions are not applicable
to a consideration of this case as defendant was acquitted of the
kidnapping charges.
3
These procedural facts are from the original trial file,
utilized by the court below and by the Utah Supreme Court in
plaintiff's original direct appeal. That record has not been
included on appeal but there is no dispute as to these procedural
aspects.
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On July 26, 1989, petitioner filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the Utah Supreme Court (R. 2-5). The
State responded by filing an answer and moving for summary
disposition (R. 67, 85-86).

On September 6, 1989, the petition

was referred to the Third Judicial District Court (R. 87).
Pro bono counsel was appointed for petitioner by the
district court at petitioner's request (R. 105-106).
Supplemental memorandum was filed by petitioner's counsel (R.
107-116) .
On January 10, 1990, a non-evidentiary hearing was held
before the Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, Third Judicial District
Court, on the petition for writ of habeas corpus and respondent's
motion for summary judgment.

The court orally granted the motion

for summary judgment and denied the petition for habeas corpus
relief (R. 135). Written findings of fact, based on the facts
established by the record, and conclusions of law were entered on
January 29, 1990 (R. 137-146).
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court on January 18, 1990 (R. 136). The matter was subsequently
referred to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The underlying facts of this case, as previously
determined by the Utah Supreme Court in affirming the
convictions, are:
On September 8, 1976, a man driving an
orange Corvette owned by [petitioner] robbed
two Weber County deputy sheriffs of their
service revolvers.
Late in September, 1976, Canadian police
officers in British Columbia arrested
-3-

[petitioner]. He was driving an orange
Corvette and had in his possession the
service revolvers stolen from the Weber
County deputies. [Petitioner] tried to shoot
one of the arresting officers and refused to
cooperate during booking. He refused to be
fingerprinted and signed his booking document
"John F. Kennedy." j[Petitioner] was forcibly
fingerprinted, "kneed" in the stomach by the
officer at whom he had shot, and placed in a
holding cell. The next day, [petitioner]
confessed to the Weber County robbery.
State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1987) (footnote
omitted).

(R. 138-139, paragraph 4).
Prior to his trial, petitioner moved the court to

dismiss the criminal charges, claiming that his right to a speedy
trial had been denied.

Petitioner asserted that an information

had been filed against him in 1976 but that the State had failed
to bring him to trial until 1985 (R. 139-140, paragraph 7).

The

trial court denied the motion (R. 140, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10).
On appeal, the issue was again raised (R. 141,
paragraph 14).

The Utah Supreme Court noted that "[a]nother

individual had been charged shortly after the crime, but those
charges were dismissed at an early stage." Wright, 745 P.2d at
449 n.l.

(R. 139, paragraph 5.)

After petitioner was arrested

in Canada, he was convicted in Canada on unrelated charges and
sentenced to serve twenty years imprisonment.

Pursuant to a

prisoner exchange program, petitioner was transferred to a United
States federal prison in 1978.

In 1979, he was transferred to

California to face other charges and then returned to the federal
prison.

In July, 1979, petitioner was transferred to the Utah

State Prison.

Wright, 745 P.2d at 449. At no time, did

petitioner request disposition of his Utah criminal charges
-4-

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1990).
450-451.

Wright, 745 P.2d at

(R. 139, paragraph 6.)
Based on these facts, the Utah Supreme Court concluded

that no sixth amendment violation occurred as the right to a
speedy trial attaches only upon the filing of an information.
The Court did not agree with petitioner's claim that the
information was filed in 1976, but concluded that the information
was filed in 1985. Wright, 745 P.2d at 449.

Further, the Court

noted:
An undue delay before charges are filed
against a defendant may constitute a
violation of the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. . . . In this case,
defendant makes no due process claim. We
note that in order to constitute a due
process violation, preaccusation delay must
cause 'actual prejudice to the defendant's
case and result in tactical advantage for the
prosecutor.' . . . Defendant has not alleged,
and the facts do not suggest, that the
prosecution delayed the filing of charges
against him in order to achieve a tactical
advantage.
Wright, 745 P.2d at 450 (citations and footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court further found that petitioner's
confession to the robberies was voluntary and therefore properly
admissible.

Wright, 745 P.2d at 451.

At trial, petitioner was represented by appointed
counsel, Bernard Allen, and was also allowed to appear pro se at
times (R. 139, paragraph 7; R. 140, paragraph 9).

On the initial

appeal, Mr. Allen continued to represent petitioner (R. 141,
paragraph 13). After the

convictions were affirmed, petitioner

was appointed new appellate counsel, Kevin Sullivan, for purposes
of filing a petition for rehearing.
-5-

The petition for rehearing

was filed August 28, 1987, and included within it a claim that
Mr. Allen was ineffective in presenting the appeal (R. 143,
paragraph 19). Petitioner also filed a pro se supplemental
petition for rehearing claiming that both Messrs. Allen and
Sullivan were ineffective (R. 143, paragraph 20).

The petitions

for rehearing were denied.
Some two years later, petitioner filed the present
petition for writ of habeas corpus (R. 2-5). Respondent moved
for summary judgment on the grounds:
1. Petitioner had failed to show any unusual
circumstances or good cause for the
relitigation of his claims in a successive
postconviction hearing;
2. Any claims of error raised by petitioner
had either been previously adjudicated or
were not supported by the record.
(R. 85-86).

The district court assigned counsel to petitioner,

Mr. Mitchell J. Olsen (R. 105-106).
the parties.

Memoranda were submitted by

The district court was supplied with the trial and

direct appeal records, including all transcripts and briefs.

A

non-evidentiary hearing was held on January 10, 1990, before the
Honorable Pat B. Brian, Judge, Third Judicial District Court, to
consider the arguments of counsel as to the appropriateness of
granting the summary judgment motion and denying the petition.
After full consideration of the record and memoranda, the court
denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus (R. 135, 147-148).
This appeal followed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
All of petitioner's present claims, with the exception
of ineffective counsel, were raised and adjudicated on direct
-6-

appeal from his convictions.

As such, petitioner is estopped

from relitigating the same matters.
The only appropriate claim for consideration
collaterally is petitioner's assertion of ineffective appellate
counsel. However, the Utah Supreme Court, in the direct appeal,
addressed the underlying claims of demonstrable error advocated
now by petitioner and found no error.

Additionally, even if it

is assumed arguendo that petitioner's appellate counsel did
commit error, petitioner has failed to establish any prejudice.
Therefore, the ineffective counsel claim must fail.
ARGUMENT
THE
FOR
HAS
THE

TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE PETITION
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS DENIED
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

Petitioner does not claim that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel at trial.

Rather, he asserts

that his appellate counsel was ineffective (Br. of Appellant at
3-5).

Each of the points now raised on appeal were raised and

fully considered by the district court in denying petitioner
habeas corpus relief.

Therefore, this Court must review the

record in the light most favorable to the judgement and uphold
the denial of collateral relief as long as there is a reasonable
basis to support the denial.
(Utah 1988).

Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805

Further, it is petitioner's burden to marshal all

the facts established from the record which support the denial,
and then demonstrate than even when viewed in the light most
favorable to the judgement of the court, that the record is
insufficient to support the court's determination of the facts.
-7-

Shearf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); Grayson
Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinsonf 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah
1989).
It is well-establish€sd that the post-conviction writ of
habeas corpus provided for in rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, "is not a substitute for and cannot be used to perform
the function of regular appellate review,"
660 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah 1983).

Codianna v. Morris,

Accord Bundy v. Deland, 763 P«2d

at 804; Wells v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987).

Rather

the function of post-conviction relief is:
to provide a means for collaterally attacking
convictions when they are so constitutionally
flawed that they result in fundamental
unfairness and to provide for collateral
attack of sentences not authorized by law.
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989).
Consequently, the relitigation of issues in successive
post-conviction hearings is limited to unusual circumstances where
it would be unconscionable not to reexamine the claim to assure
that petitioner was afforded substantial justice.

Codianna v.

Morris, 660 P.2d at 1115 (Stewart, J., concurring).
A ground for relief from a conviction or
sentence that has once been fully and fairly
adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas
proceeding should not be readjudicated unless
it can be shown that there are "unusual
circumstances." For example, a prior
adjudication is not a bar to reexamination of
a conviction if there has been a retroactive
change in the law, a subsequent discovery of
suppressed evidence, or newly discovered
evidence.
Lairby v. Barnes, 136 Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah June 5, 1990)
(quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d at 1036).

-8-

Here, the district court had before it the full record
in this case.

The court considered not only the conclusions of

the Utah Supreme Court, but also independently reviewed the
record.
The facts in this case were not disputed.

The only

fact, which petitioner even attempted to claim below to be in
dispute, was whether petitioner had been charged in 1976 such
that the sixth amendment applied or whether he was charged in
1985 such that the fifth amendment would have been applicable,
i.e., whether there had been a speedy trial violation or a
preaccusation delay.

But, the factual issue of when petitioner

was charged had previously been fully adjudicated on direct
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.
141-142, paragraphs 14 and 16)

Wright, 745 P.2d at 449.

(R.

The district court therefore

determined, based on the record facts, that petitioner was not
charged until 1985 (R. 139, paragraphs 5 and 6).

Having

determined that petitioner had fully raised this issue before the
Utah Supreme Court, which court had concluded that petitioner had
not been denied either his fifth or sixth amendment right to be
timely charged or tried, the district court properly concluded
that petitioner had suffered no constitutional violation in this
regard (R. 145, Conclusions of Law, paragraph 4).

See Wright,

745 P.2d at 449-450.
The remainder of what petitioner claims on appeal were
disputed facts are not.

Instead, the "facts" are either matters

previously fully argued and adjudicated by the Utah Supreme Court
or are legal conclusions to be drawn from the facts, i.e.,

-9-

counsel was ineffective.

The actual facts of petitioner's case,

both procedurally and substantively, were not at issue below.
Rather, petitioner's claim was simply that his counsel had
ineffectively argued those facts on direct appeal to the Utah
Supreme Court.
Generally, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
does not in itself constitute an unusual circumstance or good
cause justifying successive post-conviction litigation.
To permit the inevitable instances of
attorney oversight or ignorance to qualify
for the "unusual circumstances" exception
would allow that exception to swallow up the
rule, thereby transforming habeas corpus from
an extraordinary remedy into an alternative
appeal mechanism in contravention of the
finality of criminal judgments that is the
settled policy of this state.
Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d at 1105. Accord Dunn v. Cook, 131
Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 10-11 (Utah April 2, 1990).

However, the State

recognizes that the Utah Supreme Court has found exceptions to
this rule.

Ijd. , 131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 12; Fernandez v. Cook, 783

P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989).
The standard for determining ineffective assistance of
counsel at trial requires the petitioner to establish:
[F]irst, that his counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable
manner, which performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment and, second, that counsel's
performance prejudiced the defendant.
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d at 805 (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984), reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984)).

An

ineffectiveness claim can only be supported by demonstrable errors
of sufficient magnitude that "but for counsel's unprofessional
-10-

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1989) (citations
omitted).

Further, counsel's determination of appropriate

objections and legal arguments fall within the scope of
professional tactical choices.

State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021,

1024 (Utah 1987); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah 1982),
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).

As such, those decisions are

generally not reviewable in ineffectiveness claims since:
Trial tactics lie within the prerogative of
counsel and may not be dictated by his
client. Decisions as to what witnesses to
call, what objections to make, and by and
large, what defenses to interpose, are
generally left to the professional judgment
of counsel.
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d at 806 (quoting Wood, 648 P.2d at 91).
The underlying merits of all other claims of error by petitioner's
appellate counsel, have been previously adjudicated on direct
appeal and found not to be error.

Therefore, the district court

correctly concluded that petitioner had failed to establish any
deficient performance on the part of counsel (R. 145, Conclusions
of Law, paragraph 2).
Further, a reviewing court need not determine whether
counsel's performance was actually deficient where the petitioner
has failed to make an initial showing of prejudice to his case.
For,
If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will
often be so, that course should be followed.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 697.

In this regard, the

district court found that even if it were assumed that appellate
-11-

counsel had a deficient performance, petitioner had failed to show
any prejudice therein as required by case law (R. 145, Conclusions
of Law, paragraph 3).

Such a conclusion is fully justified where

there was overwhelming evidence of petitioner's guilt at the trial
level, and no errors found at the appellate level*
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying the
petition for writ of habeas corpus should be affirmed*
DATED this

day of June, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

(CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
^X
Assistant Attorney General
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